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Within the Anglo-American systems of corporate governance, the role of 
institutional investors and their relationship with corporate management are of 
central importance. The largest shareholders of most large, listed corporations 
are investment funds and fund managers, and collectively the institutions 
dominate both share holdings and share dealings. When the governance systems 
are described, as they commonly are, in terms of the separation of ownership 
and control (Berle & Means, 1932; Monks & Minow, 2003; OECD, 1999; Roe, 
1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), the relationship between the institutional 
investors (who dominate ownership) and the corporate managers (who exercise 
control) is implicitly placed at center stage. 
 
If we ask more specifically what the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance is, however, and how they interact with corporate management, the 
answers are surprisingly unclear. Direct empirical studies are rare, and restricted 
largely to the case of activist institutions, primarily public pension funds, that 
are not necessarily typical of the investment community as a whole (see for 
example Useem, 1996; Romano, 2001; and for a rare examples of a broader 
studies Holland, 1998). Theoretical analyses are more commonplace, but their 
conceptualizations are drawn from a variety of research traditions, the 
underlying assumptions of which are not always consistent.  
 
The dominant theoretical perspective is that of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Indeed the relationship between 
shareholders and managers is sometimes treated as a paradigmatic case of a 
principal-agent relationship. But there is a growing concern that this is too 
simplistic a view (e.g. Daily et al, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). It is evident, for example, that shareholders are not the only 
‘principals’ for whom managers are agents. They also have agency-type 
relationships with banks and bondholders. Other stakeholders, such as 
employees and communities, are not naturally cast as principals but nevertheless 
have legitimate claims on management’s attention. The interests of shareholders 
are themselves diverse, and many might more naturally be desribed as financial 
traders than as owners in any meaningful sense. Institutional investors typically 
have shareholdings in competing companies, and if underweight in a particular 
company (i.e. holding fewer shares than they would if holding an index-
matching portfolio) they may actually have an interest in that company under-
performing relative to those of its competitors in which they are overweight. 
Generally the interests of an investing institution may be very different from 
those of a company in which it invests, and different too from those on whose 
behalf it is investing. The fund management institutions can themselves be seen 
as agents of the pension fund trustees (acting in turn on behalf of pension fund  
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beneficiaries) whose mandates they hold, and for which they compete among 
themselves. Finally, while agency theory assumes that all parties are motivated 
by economic self-interest and are fully competent to achieve their aims, the 
possibilities that they may also have a sense of moral duty or be constrained in 
other ways are hard to rule out. Managers in particular, working in an 
organizational context, rely heavily on the cooperative efforts of others and may 
well act themselves as honest fiduciaries. 
 
None of these considerations invalidates an agency theory approach, providing 
that it is pursued rigorously and consistently, but they do suggest a complex 
reality for which other theoretical approaches, incorporating moral, political and 
organizational as well as economic considerations are also salient. In this paper 
we shall begin by reviewing some of the more prominent theoretical 
conceptualizations of institutional investors, their role in the corporate 
governance process, and their interactions with corporate management. We shall 
then draw on a series of interviews with senior fund managers and senior 
company executives to explore how these different and often-contradictory 
conceptualizations are reflected in the attitudes and perceptions of the actors 
concerned. We shall conclude that while conceptualizations based on agency 
and ownership dominate both academic and popular treatments of corporate 
governance, the dominant actor perspectives are those that cast institutional 
investors primarily as financial traders or, from a management perspective, as 
politically powerful resource providers. The second of these conceptualizations 
appears particularly salient in understanding how managers interact with their 
investor communities, and we shall finish by calling for a renewed attention to 
resource-dependence and other political perspectives on corporate governance. 
 
Theoretical Conceptualizations 
Issues of corporate governance have been explored within a number of research 
traditions, including those of finance, economics, law and sociology, and both 
academic and popular conceptualizations of institutional investors owe 
something to each of these. 
 
Within much of the finance literature, where the focus is on the market rather 
than on the firm, investors are characterized as market traders, whose sole 
interest is in maximizing their financial returns by buying and selling shares. 
Ownership of shares here carries little if any significance. Corporate managers 
feature in the investors’ worldview to the extent that their actions can influence 
the share price, but share ownership no more gives stock market investors a 
stake in the polity of the corporation than the ownership of a foreign currency 
gives currency traders a stake in a country’s politics. Management actions, like  
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the actions of politicians, are effectively treated as exogenous variables over 
which the market actors have no control. Even where an investor maintains a 
substantial long-term holding in a company, this is interpreted simply as the 
result of a particular trading strategy, based on particular assumptions and 
beliefs concerning the information properties of the market, the valuation of 
particular stocks and the temporal relationships between valuation and stock 
price. 
 
Within the economic literature on the theory of the firm, investors feature rather 
differently. With the focus on the firm, seen typically as a nexus of contracts 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), rather than upon the stock market, investors are 
characterized as economic actors who contract with management for the supply 
of risk capital. As owners of a company’s share capital, they are the residual 
risk-takers of the enterprise, and this gives them a particular interest in its fate. 
On account of this interest, they are often characterized as principals, and the 
firm’s managers as agents, in a principal-agent relationship, but they are not 
seen as the owners of the firm itself. Like other parties to the nexus of contracts 
they are simply owners of a particular factor of production, and any property 
rights they might claim derive from that (Fama, 1980; Hart & Moore, 1990). 
 
Although they differ in focus, these two literatures have in common that they 
treat actors and their relationships in purely economic terms. The underlying 
model of human behavior is that of economic man, self-seeking, amoral and 
competently utility maximizing, where utility is typically measured (not as a 
matter of principle but as a matter of necessary convenience) in purely monetary 
terms. This model is applied both to investors and, in the theory of the firm, to 
company managers. All interactions take the form of economic exchanges, and 
while both literatures afford a central role to contracts (in particular, contracts 
for the sale or purchase of shares and for the payment of dividends), contracts 
are kept only because it is in the long-term economic interests of the parties to 
keep them. 
 
In the legal and sociological traditions, in contrast, the focus has traditionally 
been on quite different aspects of human behavior, on rights and duties in one 
case, and on power and influence in the other. 
 
Within the corporate law literature, the focus is upon the legal rights and duties 
of the different parties involved in a company, and investors are typically 
characterized either as owners of the company in which they invest (in the USA) 
or as members of the company whose membership gives them rights closely 
akin to those of ownership (in the UK). Prominent among these ownership rights  
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is the right to have the company managed primarily, and subject only to 
relatively minor qualifications, for their interest and benefit. Consistent with 
this, company managers are portrayed as having a fiduciary duty either to their 
shareholders directly (in the USA) or to the company and thus to the 
shareholders as its members (in the UK). The extent to which ownership carries 
responsibilities as well as rights is open to debate, but there is a general 
presumption that as with the ownership of anything else of value in which other 
parties also have a stake or interest, there is some duty of care. There is also a 
presumption that the duties of managers are accompanied by certain rights, 
including in American law the right to exercise “business judgment”. Both 
investors and managers are cast primarily as moral beings, and the relationship 
posited between them is seen as both legal and moral (for standard accounts see 
Mann & Roberts, 2001; Twomey & Fox, 2001; Monks & Minow, 2003; and for 
the UK, Ferran, 1999). 
 
Within the sociological literature, the focus has been mainly upon the relative 
power of different social groups or classes and the systems within which this 
power is entrenched. Here the investment community (or, more broadly, the 
financial community) and the management community feature as competing 
interest groups within a political arena. They are not the only such groups. 
Others include organized labor, the state, and wealthy family interests, all of 
which are or have been prominent in different societies and at different periods. 
In the contemporary Anglo-American system of diversified share ownership, 
however, in which state intervention is limited, labor markets have been 
deregulated and trades unions have lost much of their former power, institutional 
investors, who control the lion’s share of financial resources, and managers, who 
control the operations of their companies, are seen as the dominant rivals, 
competing against each other for the political control of business  (Scott, 1997; 
see also Useem 1996). This competition is partly economic, as each party seeks 
to enhance its share of the wealth created by business activity, but within the 
sociological perspective power is also seen as an end in itself.  
 
The rapidly growing literature on corporate governance draws on all these 
traditions, but it is dominated by a particular and arguably confused combination 
of the financial, economic and legal perspectives. Institutional investors are 
typically characterized both as traders, whose primary purpose is to make money 
out of their trading and, when they happen in the course of their trading 
activities to be in possession of a particular shareholdings, as company owners, 
with all the rights that entails. Company managers, similarly, are characterized 
both as self-interested, amoral economic agents, and as moral agents with 
fiduciary responsibilities.   
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The dominant theory within the corporate governance literature is agency 
theory, and when strictly applied, as it mainly is by the finance and economics 
communities, this avoids the contradictions we have noted. Based on the 
behavioral model of economic man, agency theory is concerned simply with 
how one self-seeking party to an arrangement, identified as the principal, 
influences the behavior of another self-seeking party, the agent, so as to 
maximize their own utility. In the corporate governance context, in which the 
shareholders are typically cast as principals and the managers as agents, it is 
assumed that rational managers will seek to serve their own interests over those 
of their shareholders, and no moral blame is attached to this. There is no notion 
of fiduciary duty, and no privileging of ownership: agency theorists can and do 
treat other parties, such as bondholders or bank creditors, as principals, as well 
as addressing problems of multiple principals (Myers, 1977; Harris & Raviv, 
1991; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003).  
 
Agency theory is no longer simply a branch of economics, however. In the 
context of corporate governance the application of agency theory ideas has 
spilled over both into common parlance and into literatures and discursive 
arenas, most obviously those of government and regulation, that do not share its 
core assumptions. It has become commonplace to observe that the central 
problem of corporate governance is how investors can get self-seeking managers 
to act in their (the investors’) interests, rather than in their own, but this 
observation is often set within a framework that sees the investors as owners 
(albeit as insufficiently “responsible” owners) and the managers as insufficiently 
dutiful fiduciaries. (See for example the standard corporate governance text by 
Monks & Minow, 2003) There is confusion here both in respect of the 
behavioral assumptions and in respect of the attributed roles. 
 
When we consider how and for whom companies should be managed, and how 
managers should interact with and respond to their institutional investors, this 
confusion is of considerable practical importance. If managers see serving their 
own self-interest as a legitimate goal (as agency theory assumes) their behavior 
will likely be very different from if they see themselves as having a fiduciary 
responsibility to shareholders. If they see their institutional investors as traders, 
with no interests in the rights or responsibilities of ownership, they will likely 
interpret their own duties differently than if they see them as responsible 
owners, or as political competitors.  
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Data And Method 
To explore how the roles of institutional investors and company managers are 
conceptualized in practice, we conducted a series of semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with senior fund managers and chief investment officers on one hand 
and chief financial officers and investment relations / corporate communications 
directors on the other. In all the firms we researched the chief financial officer 
was a member of the main board who took primary responsibility for 
shareholder relationships. 
 
The focus of our interviews was on the meetings that take place on a regular 
basis (yearly or half-yearly) between the senior managers (normally the chief 
executive officer and/or the chief financial officer) of a quoted company and 
their main institutional investors. In most cases we did not ask explicitly how the 
roles and relationships in which we are interested here were conceptualized. By 
engaging our interviewees in wide ranging discussions around the central topic, 
however, we were able to gain considerable insights into the conceptualizations 
that informed their attitudes and behaviors. 
 
For reasons of convenience and to facilitate access, the research was conducted 
in London, England. On the corporate side we constructed a sample of twenty 
companies from the FTSE-100, chosen to give a broad spread of recent stock 
market history and industry sector. Pure investment companies and real estate 
companies, whose values are closely tied to asset value, were excluded, as were 
South African companies using London purely as a listing of convenience. Of 
the twenty companies approached, fourteen agreed to interviews. In nine of 
these we interviewed the chief financial officer, either alone or in the company 
of the investor relations director, and in the remaining five we interviewed the 
investor relations or corporate communications director. Of the fourteen 
companies researched, three were in the retail sector, two in food and beverages, 
two in aerospace and defense, two in pharmaceuticals and health products and 
one each in banking, media, telecomm, oil and gas, and automobiles and 
engineering. The average market capitalization of the companies at the time of 
interview was about $30 billion. Apart from the retailers all were global 
businesses and most had significant US as well as UK shareholdings. Eight of 
the fourteen had ADR listings on the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
On the institutional investor side we sought interviews with the top twenty UK-
based investment houses measured by assets under management. Eleven of the 
twenty agreed to participate, leading to a total of eighteen interviews with chief 
executives, chief investment officers and senior fund managers, typically heads 
of UK or European equities. One of these resulted in no data relevant to the  
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issues discussed here. Of the ten remaining houses, one was independent, six 
were subsidiaries of globally-operating investment banks, and three were 
subsidiaries of large insurance companies.  
 
The interviews were conducted between Spring 2002 and Spring 2003 and 
ranged from one to two hours in length. With two exceptions, where detailed 
notes were taken, they were recorded, transcribed and thematically coded using 
a two-stage process, the first being based on categories arising from the 
literature and the second on categories emerging from the texts. Our analysis 
was based on a form of discourse analysis rooted in discursive social psychology 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Harré and Gillett, 1994; c.f. Watson & Harris, 1999, 
for a similar approach). Treating the accounts offered in the interviews as 
socially achieved constructions that reflected both the interview situation and the 
world of practice being described, our aim was to explore how our interviewees 
perceived the worlds of practice and social action in which they were 
professionally engaged. The approach required that we pay attention not just to 
the conceptual content of the interviews but also to the rhetorical and referential 
contexts within which different conceptualizations were employed (Fairclough, 
1992) and to the structural properties of the discourse (Heracleous and Hendry, 
2000), specifically in this case to the hierarchical relationships between 
conceptualizations and the thematic structures associated with these (Kets de 
Vries & Miller, 1987). 
 
In addition to our interviews, we also observed a total of eight meetings between 
senior corporate managers (chairman, CEO or CFO) and their institutional 
investors, five of which were regular one-to-one meetings between a large 
company and one of its large institutional investors. The others were a meeting 
between an institution and a large company in which it was not at that time an 
investor, a meeting between an institution and a small cap company in which it 
had a significant shareholding, and a lunch meeting between a company and a 
number of smaller institutional shareholders arranged by the company’s broker. 
The seven one-to-one meetings involved six different companies and four 
different institutions. We were not able to record these meetings, but they gave 
us an opportunity to observe the interactions between investors and managers 
directly and crosscheck our interpretations of the interview data. 
 
Research Findings 
Summaries of our analysis, necessarily simplified, are given in the tables. Table 
1 summarizes the accounts given by investors of themselves, of other investors 
and of company managers. Table 2 summarizes the accounts given by managers 
of themselves, their investors and their management of investor relationships, In  
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each case the left hand column lists explicit conceptualizations and descriptions, 
with contextual qualifications in parentheses. The right hand column 
summarizes the underlying conceptualizations that structure each account taken 
as a whole. 
 
TABLE 1 





Investor A (Head of European Equities)
1  
Account of selves 
Traders of shares, buying and selling to maximize profits 
for clients 
 
Traders, but in position of principals 
Account of other investors 
Competitors, also traders to varying extent 
 
Competitors, similar to selves 
Account of managers 
Mainly partners, but many self-interest agents 
 
Agents or stewards for shareholders 
  
Investor B (Head of European Equities)   




Account of other investors 
 
 
Competitors, also traders 
Account of managers   
Stewards for company (but not clear) 
  
Investor C (Senior Fund Manager)   
Account of selves 
Traders, seeking to maximize profit for clients and out-
perform competitors 
Investors on whom companies depend for capital 
Owners 
 
Traders who end up as owners 
Account of other investors   
Competitors, similar to selves 
Account of managers 
Should be acting as fiduciaries in long-term interest of 
shareholders, and mostly are. 
 
Stewards for owners 
  
Investor D (Head of European Equities)   
Account of selves 
Traders maximizing value for clients and outperforming 




Account of other investors 
Competitors, with some shared interests 
Competitors 
Account of managers   
Not clear 
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Investor E (Senior Fund Manager; Head of Corporate Governance) 
Account of selves 
Investors adding value for clients 
 
Owners and also traders 




Account of managers 
 
 
Stewards for owners 
  
Investor F (Chief Investment Officer; Head of European Equities; Senior Fund Manager) 
Account of selves 
Traders, making money for clients by buying and selling 
Not principals 
Not owners [when underweight even have interest in 
company doing badly] 
Responsible owners [when selling services to clients] 
 
May have to present selves as owners, 
but really traders 
Account of other investors 




Account of managers 
Stewards for company, with varying degrees of competence 
Self-interest agents 
Should be putting investors first 
 
Fiduciaries for generalized owners 
  
Investor G (Chief Investment Officer; Head of UK Equities; Senior Fund Manager) 
Account of selves 
Traders, trying to out-perform market and beat competitors 
Part-owners [where particularly large stake, or in corporate 
governance context which kept separate from trading; for 
portfolio reasons may hold shares where would rather not] 
 
Traders who sometimes fill role of 
owners 




Account of managers   
Stewards for company 
  
Investor H (Regional Chief Executive. Chief Investment Officer; Head of UK Equities; Head of 
Corporate Governance) 
Account of selves 
Agents of clients as owners 
Managing client assets through trading and oversight, and 
competing for that business 
Duty to be responsible owners, independent of making 
money 
 
Both traders and owner-principals, or 
agents of owners 
Account of other investors 
Trading competitors and competitors for client business 
Some also co-owners / agents of co-owners [ownership 
activities kept completely separate from trading] 
Some pure traders 
 
Both competitors and co-owners 
Account of managers 
 
 
Stewards for company 
   
  10
 
Investor I (Head of UK Equities)   
Account of selves 
Principals monitoring managers and keeping them 
accountable 
Not owners, but bear obligations of responsible ownership 
[but limited when underweight] 
Traders seeking to out-perform competitors 
 
Principals. Ambiguous on ownership 




Account of managers   
Agents 
  
Investor J (Chief Executive; Chief Investment Officer; Head of Corporate Governance) 
Account of selves 
Asset managers making money for clients 
Owners 
Principals monitoring managers 
 
Owner-principals 




Account of managers 
Should be fiduciaries delivering shareholder value 

















Company 1 (Chief Financial Officer and Investor Relations Director)
1 
Account of selves 
 
Stewards for company (not 
shareholder) interests 
Account of investors 
Customers for company’s shares 
Traders, stock-churners 
Determine share price 
Enable deals, rights issues etc 
Potential source of huge problems 
Not owners or principals and don’t determine management 
behavior [but no point driving company against their 
wishes] 
Messages can be used internally [company has past history 
of investor dissatisfaction and is now strongly focused in 
shareholder value] 
 
Owners in generalized sense, but in 
practice neither owners nor principals: 
traders and resource providers, to be 
both managed and used for internal 
discipline. Element of partnership 
 
Account of relationship management 
Manage information flow to manage expectations and 
control speculation 
Avoid surprises, pre-condition to changes 
Build personal relationships and mutual understanding 
Broaden investor base; actively sell shares 
 
Manage relationships to moderate 
power 
  
Company 2 (Chief Financial Officer and Investor Relations Director) 
Account of selves 
 
 
Stewards for overall company interests 
Account of investors 
Customers, whose needs we aim to meet 
Long term shareholder needs dictate strategy [but value-
based management described as strategy technique to 
perform for all stakeholder, not as part of duty to owners] 
 
Customers and stakeholders. Not 
principals 
Account of relationship management 
Clarity and accuracy to maximize investor understanding 
Explain what doing and why; meet any concerns by 
explaining better [strategy serves shareholder needs, so just 
need to explain it] 
Find out what investors want so can give it to them 
 
Clarify stakeholder objectives and 
provide customer service 
  
Company 3 (Investor Relations Director) 
Account of selves Unclear 
Account of investors 
Traders, churning stock 
Can cause serious difficulties if feel mistreated [company 
was recently in serious trouble] 
 
Traders. Important stakeholders and 
resource providers 
Account of relationship management 
Keep open, accessible, reasonable; importance of clarity 
Avoid arrogance 
Build ‘credit in bank’ 
Actively sell shares 
 
Keep happy, avoid trouble, neutralize 
power  
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Company 4 (Chief Financial Officer and Investor Relations Director) 
Account of selves 
 
 
Agents who should be stewards for 
owners 
Account of investors 
Owners of business [and by implication principals] 
Determine share price and so constrain options 
 
Owners and principals 
Account of relationship management 
Maximize transparency and understanding 
Lock management into shareholders’ wishes 
 
Ensure shareholders understand 
business so can make appropriate 
decisions 
  
Company 5 (Chief Financial Officer and Investor Relations Director) 
Account of selves 
Stewards 
 
Stewards for company as a whole 
Account of investors 
Owners acting as principals 
Traders, making market and determining share price 
Customer to whom we [choose to] market our shares 
 
Owners at one level. Traders and 
resource providers at another 
Account of relationship management 
Broaden shareholder base; actively sell shares 
Get accurate information into market, subject to constraints 
of not giving away too much to customers and competitors 
Explain what we are doing and convince them it’s right 
 
Manage resource providers and 
neutraslise their power 
  
Company 6 (Investor Relations Director)   
Account of selves 
Stewards with fiduciary responsibility to owners 
 
 
Stewards for company, but with 
particular duties to owners 
Account of investors 
Owners to whom owe duty [in specific context of meetings] 
Gamblers, betting on management teams [same context] 
Customers for our shares 
Control our ability to make acquisitions 
Traders, buying and selling to make a profit [when 
comparing them with each other] 
 
Owners or traders, depending on 
perspective 
Account of relationship management 
Sell shares to broaden shareholder base 
Determine what owners want so can take account of, but 
not necessarily follow, it 
Build support to give future freedom of action 
 
Treat as powerful resource providers 
and manage to limit power 
  
Company 7 (Investor Relations Director)   




Account of investors 
Traders, who set share price [which company uses to 
manage internally] 
 
Traders whose actions can affect us 
Account of relationship management 
Build long-term relationships 
Enhance understanding of company 
Manage information flow to manage expectations 
Manage share price 
 
Manage resource providers  
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Company 8 (Investor Relations Director)   
Account of selves 
Stewards for company as a whole [implicitly not for 
owners] 
 
Stewards for company as a whole 
Account of investors 
Traders who make money out of us – no ownership 
commitment 
Set share price [which we use and need to be stable to 
manage internally] 
Can get us taken over [which we don’t want] 
 
Traders and resource providers. Only 
artificially owners 
Account of relationship management 
Sell shares and broaden investor base 
Avoid major surprises 
Get feedback on our targets 
Keep investors happy and manageable 
 
Manage resource providers 
  
Company 9 (Investor Relations Director)   
Account of selves 
Stewards of company [but not especially of owners] 
Stewards of company as a whole 
Account of investors 
Technically owners 
Behave like traders, short term and sellout if things get 
rough [business has very long internal investment horizons] 
Control ability to defend against bids 
Powerful audience who can change management, limit 
actions and influence public perceptions of company 
Source of company 
 
Traders and very powerful resource 
providers 
Account of relationship management 
Build good relationships and long-term commitment based 
on shared understanding 
Give out consistent message, not too much detail [share 
performance has been very volatile] 
Make sure they get our message – if they disagree, change 
way we communicate it 
 
Mange power relationship with key 
resource providers 
  
Company 10 (Chief Financial Officer)   
Account of selves 
Stewards for shareholder present and future 
 
Stewards for long-term shareholders 
Account of investors 
Stakeholders to whom we owe an account of what we are 
doing 
They control our possibilities, e.g. rights issues for 
acquisitions 
Short-term traders who set share price [which used for 
internal incentive schemes, though do not adopt value 
based management] 
Different investors have very different objectives 
[distinguishing legitimately (since mandated) short term 
traders from long term investors] 
 
Owners in generalized sense and 
stakeholder to whom have particular 
obligations. But also traders and 
powerful resource providers 
Account of relationship management 
Build good relationships to preserve options 
Build confidence to free us to manage 
Sell shares 
 
Mix between fulfilling duties and 
managing powerful resource providers  
  14
Give insights and information on performance 




Company 11 (Chief Financial Officer)   
Account of selves 
 
 
Managers of business aiming to 
maximize value 
Account of investors 
Part of capital allocation system 
Some are short-term traders 
Can constrain our actions 
Not principals [and implicitly not owners] 
 
Investors of capital and powerful 
resource providers 
Account of relationship management 
Maximize transparency to gain credit 
Deliver on promises to build investor confidence 
Important to stand up to investors – do what you think best, 
but communicate it well 
Manage shareholder base 
 
Manage resource providers 
  
Company 12 (Chief Financial Officer)   
Account of selves 
 
 
Stewards for company as a whole 
Account of investors 
Buyers of rights issues 
Determine share price, which impacts on business 
[company uses value based management, but no sense of 
duty to owners] 
Traders following their mandates 
 
Traders and hence resource providers. 
Customers 
Account of relationship management 




Company 13 (Chief Financial Officer)   
Account of selves 
Aiming to maximize long-term performance 
 
Stewards for company as a whole 
Account of investors 
Buy and sell so set share price [low share price or share 
price volatility can constrain management] 
Traders, maximizing their clients’ and their own profits  
Big investor is important stakeholder, but may sell 
tomorrow 
 
Traders and important interest group 
who can disrupt management 
Account of relationship management 
Manage share price 
Manage expectations 
Position business [following recent change of strategic 
direction] 
Deliver on promises to maintain market confidence 
Communicate clearly and transparently to reduce 
guesswork and speculation and avoid share price volatility 
 
Manage interest group who 
incidentally control resources 
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Company 14 (Chief Financial Officer)   
Account of selves 
Manage for long-term shareholder value [but no sense of 
duty to actual shareholders; business has very long term 
investment horizons compared to investor horizons] 
 
Stewards for company as a whole 
Account of investors 
Providers of capital and supporting votes 
Portfolio managers 
Can constrain decisions if don’t trust you 
Customers who buy our shares or someone else’s 
Wide range of objectives [and of views as to what 
managers should be doing] 
 
Resource providers and allocators of 
capital who can constrain investment 
decisions. Customers 
Account of relationship management 
Putting accurate basis of fact into market 
Avoid surprises; communicate changes over long period 
Find out limits of investor tolerance 
Find out what they want so we can deliver 
Explain what doing and deliver on promises [so as to earn 
right to make investment decisions] 
Keep customers happy 
 
Keep key resource providers satisfied 
so as to preserve freedom of action 
  




No one conceptualization dominated our interviewee’s discourses. Indeed most 
of our interviewees gave accounts of their own and others’ roles that were on the 
surface internally inconsistent. 
 
Investors’ accounts differed somewhat between the more active investors on one 
hand, those whose investment strategies were based on individual stock-picking 
and active trading in an attempt to outperform the market, and on the other hand 
the quantitative (computer program driven) investors, those with long-term 
holding strategies, and more passive investors whose portfolios tracked or 
deviated only marginally from the index.  
 
The more active investors presented themselves primarily as money managers, 
creating value for their clients (and so winning business and making money for 
themselves) by trading in shares, with no interest in ownership and interacting 
with company managers purely and simply to check out and enhance their 
valuation models. Other institutional investors were treated very explicitly as 
competitors and not as co-owners. However while one interviewee stressed that 
his house did not irritate managers by “acting the principal”, others described 
the relationship between shareholders and managers explicitly as one between 
principals and agents. Some also criticized managers, sometimes using quite 
emotive and morally charged language, for not appreciating that their duty was  
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to run the company for the benefits of its shareholders. One senior fund manager 
not only shifted between all these characterizations in the course of our 
interview but introduced another element too, suggesting that a healthy 
relationship between managers and investors was one of “partnership”. Two 
interviewees from another house, a chief investment officer and his most senior 
fund manager told us one how the house emphatically did not see itself in an 
ownership role and the other how it did. 
 
The more passive investors tended to give a greater priority to their role as 
owners, and as principals and monitors in an agency relationship, but they 
presented conflicting views of what ownership entailed, mixing agency notions 
of shareholders as self-interested principals with notions of morally responsible 
ownership and with notions of ownership responsibility as a competitive selling 
point, a role or positioning they could offer their clients as part of their fund 
management service. Managers similarly were treated one moment as self-
interested agents to be monitored and controlled and another as dutiful stewards 
running businesses for the benefit of shareholders and to the best of their ability. 
 
In sharp contrast to the investors, none of the managers we interviewed 
described the investor-company relationship explicitly in terms of principals and 
agents. Perhaps not surprisingly, all appeared to see themselves as dutiful 
stewards, rather than as self-interested agents. Perhaps more surprisingly, given 
the dominance of the rhetoric of ownership in public and political discourse, 
only four out of fourteen described their investors explicitly as owners, and even 
here the term seemed to be used in a conventional sense rather than as a 
descriptor of the perceived social reality. One interviewee set out by describing 
investors as owners to whom management owed a fiduciary duty, but went on to 
discuss them as if they were traders, with no legitimate ownership interest. 
Another began by using the language of ownership but quickly dropped it and 
began to talk of shareholders as a company resource, to be managed like any 
other. A third, similarly, seemed to treat the owners of a business as supporters, 
rather like the fans of a football club. For the fourth they were “technically 
owners”, but “I don’t think we perceive they behave like owners”. Curiously, 
the companies most strongly committed to shareholder value management 
systems were amongst those in which the status of shareholders was most 
explicitly not privileged in terms of ownership. The concept of managing for 
shareholder value, as a tool for focusing management attention and so enhancing 
corporate performance, seemed to be largely divorced from the concept of 




Most of the managers interviewed shifted between two characterizations of their 
investors, as financial traders, serving their own clients, and as resource 
providers, or suppliers of capital. Reflecting the confusion that inevitably arises 
when what is supplied is money, some also talked of them as customers, to 
whom the company had to be sold. When discussing the specifics of their 
relationship with their investors, they used a mixture of political and economic 
language, but whereas the investors tended to describe the relationship in 
economic or moral terms, the tone of the managers’ discourse was 
predominantly political. They talked of the need to maintain good relationships 
and keep shareholders on side, of the importance of managing expectations and 
controlling the flow of information, of the value of broadening the shareholder 
base, and of working to keep options open and maintain a freedom of maneuver.  
 
On the face of it, these interviews present us with myriad inconsistencies. These 
begin to get resolved, however, when we look at the structures of the discourses 
being analyzed and at the social and organizational contextualizations of the 
interviewees’ comments.  
 
First, both managers and investors seem to accept that shareholders in general 
are in some sense owners of the firm, with concomitant rights and 
responsibilities. Managers accept that they have a general duty to manage their 
companies for the benefit of their shareholders, and that shareholders as a body 
can legitimately expect them to engage in a constructive discussion as to what 
that duty might entail. Investors for their part recognize that the shareholders of 
a company have a duty to watch over it and to ensure that it is competently 
managed. For both sides, however, these rights and duties seem to reflect 
general, almost theoretical features of the capitalist system as operated in 
America and Britain, and to refer to shareholders in the abstract. They are not 
apparently conceived as duties owed by or to any particular shareholders, either 
individually or collectively. The owner-fiduciary model, in other words, acts as 
an ideal description of the system but not as a real description of the situation 
with which the actors are in practice faced. In conceptualizing this real world of 
day-to-day practice, neither managers nor investors cast the latter as owners. 
 
The more active investors clearly see themselves, and are indeed seen by 
managers, as primarily traders. They may occasionally take on ownership 
functions, either to satisfy their clients’ needs to be seen to be pursuing 
“responsible ownership” or, as a matter of necessity, if they find managers 
acting clearly against their interests and are constrained for one reason or 
another from selling their shares. In simple terms it may on occasion be less 
costly to play the owner and try and force a change of direction than to offload a  
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large block of shares. For the most part, however, they seem to take on these 
ownership functions very reluctantly and as a last resort. Their job as they see it 
is to make money for their clients, and so for themselves, by trading in shares, 
and the fact that they are perforce shareholders is incidental. If they could have 
the investment without the ownership they would: indeed their approach to their 
work seems to be very close to that of hedge fund managers (many of whom 
were themselves once conventional fund managers), who tend to deal in options 
and contracts for difference rather than holding shares directly. That the 
institutional fund managers end up being shareholders is a peculiarity of the 
mandates given them by their clients: it has no deeper significance. 
 
The more passive investors also come across as reluctant owners. They more 
frequently find themselves engaged in ownership activities, taking a more 
activist stance, for example, on issues of corporate governance. But they do so 
mainly because it helps them to attract clients or because, with little opportunity 
to trade, there is little else they can do to add client value. To a certain extent 
acting the owner helps them to differentiate what would otherwise be a 
commodity product. As for the active investors, however, they end up being 
shareholders only because they happen to specialize in investing in shares 
(rather than in, say, government bonds) and ownership remains incidental to the 
primary task of investing.  
 
All this was clearly recognized, and seen as quite legitimate, by the managers 
we interviewed, who described the motivations of their institutional investors in 
very much the same terms as the investors used themselves. The managers 
recognized a duty to shareholders in general, and were also quite willing to cite 
this duty for their own purposes, using share price based incentives for senior 
management and imposing on their employees the need to meet shareholder 
expectations. But these were to a large extent expectations they had themselves 
raised, on the basis of performance targets they wished to meet. AT a general 
level these targets may have been the product of disciplinary market processes, 
but the managers clearly did not recognize any duty to shareholders in 
particular, who were characterized as playing their own (trading) games and as 
having little real interest, and so little legitimate interest, in how the companies 
were managed. 
 
Of course, all the managers we interviewed met regularly with their main 
institutional shareholders but this was not described by either side as a form of 
principal-agent monitoring, and did not appear as such from our direct 
observations. Investors used the meetings primarily to clarify points of detail 
relevant to their financial valuation models and to gauge the quality of the top  
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management team. They talked of monitoring their consistency from one 
meeting to another, looking at the whites of their eyes, and looking at the body 
language of CEO-CFO relationships, not in order to pass judgment or monitor 
for self-seeking but in order to gain some kind of metric of management quality 
for feeding into their investment decision-making. Two of the more passive 
investors did also talk, in principal-agent terms, of watching over management, 
and impressing on them that they were being watched, but this was presented 
more as a rationalization for governance activities than as characterization of the 
routine meetings, which seemed even for these institutions to have more to do 
with valuation.
1 The managers for their part recognized that this was the agenda, 
and played to it. 
 
A slightly different situation arises when shareholders call for a non-routine 
meeting with the company management, typically to discuss a proposed 
acquisition or merger or other major investment. Here the investors, whether 
active or passive, appear to put on their ownership hats and seek to engage the 
managers in a discussion as to whether the proposed course of action will add or 
destroy shareholder value. Talking about meetings of this kind, the managers 
drew a distinction between short-term and long-term investors, and clearly 
privileged their interactions with the latter. This was not, however, because they 
saw these as in some sense ‘real owners’, but because they recognized a 
commonality of interest that made constructive dialogue possible and 
worthwhile. Short-term shareholders, they suggested, were interested only in the 
immediate share price implications of the deal, and in detailed issues of timing 
that might affect their trading plans. Long-term shareholders would be more 
interested, as they themselves were, in the impact on the company’s longer-term 
growth and development. 
 
From the investors’ perspective, these meetings provided the primary context for 
the use of principal-agent language. As we have already noted, the managers 
saw themselves implicitly as dutiful stewards rather than as self-seeking agents. 
This may simply reflect that fact that people often do prefer to see themselves as 
morally responsible, but managers also work in an organizational context in 
which cooperation and team work are essential, self-seeking is frowned upon 
and senior managers in particular are expected to devote themselves to the 
company’s interests. In such a context explicit self-interest is likely to be 
relatively rare, or at least suppressed. Both rhetorically and in practice, a stance 
of honest commitment is likely to be more productive (Perrow, 1986; Ghoshal & 
Moran, 1996; Pfeffer, 1997). Investors for the most part cast managers in a 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that even the most passive investors we interviewed were not pure index managers: all had 
some funds under active management.   
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similar light. Most were seen as honest, hardworking people doing a pretty good 
job. There is a widespread (and empirically grounded) perception, however, that 
corporate acquisitions are pursued more to enhance managerial self-esteem and 
pay packets than to serve the interests of shareholders, who typically pay over 
the odds for the company acquired (Morck et al, 1989; Sirower, 1997). In a 
mergers and acquisitions context, as also in the context of particularly generous 
CEO pay awards, suspicions of self-interest evidently come to the fore. 
Managers get recast, not as a generalization but temporarily and in the specific 
circumstance, as self-seeking agents, and investors as principals. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are also, typically, where managers most need their 
shareholders’ support, either in the form of a vote or as providers of further 
capital. The interactions to which they lead fall outside the routine of their 
regular exchanges and are treated by both sides as exceptional, and not the 
norm. But whereas for investors they typically affect only a small part of an 
investment portfolio, and seem to be a nuisance or irritation as much as 
anything, for managers they are of critical importance. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the conceptualization of investors that seems to be most salient 
for managers is that of resource providers. 
 
In our interviews with managers, this conceptualization of investors underpinned 
all others. Investors might behave as traders, they might in some generalized or 
ideal sense be owners, they might occasionally engage as if principals, but what 
structured the managerial discourse was an underlying presumption that from 
the practical perspective of people trying to run a business they were providers 
of a scarce and valuable resource. Central to this presumption, moreover, was 
the further presumption that control over that resource gave the investors power 
to constrain the managers’ actions and frustrate their attempts to build and 
develop their business. From this core perspective investors were not so much a 
party whose interests determined the proper running of the business but a party 
whose interests could potentially damage the proper running of the business, if 
they were not carefully managed politically. 
 
The managers we interviewed perceived themselves to be acutely dependent on 
their institutional investors in two ways. As a matter of routine, they felt 
dependent on them not to upset the apple cart by selling their shares and so 
driving the share price down. Apart from reflecting badly on themselves, a low 
or falling share price restricted their strategic options and brought unwelcome 
attention in the form of critical media comment. Since most companies used 
some kind of share based or share price based compensation, it also affected 
employee moral.  Volatility in the share price was also seen as troublesome.  
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Again this disrupted strategic planning, led to distracting and unwanted critical 
exposure, and played havoc with compensation planning. Some of the 
interviewees had been through periods in which their companies had been out of 
favor with the markets, and clearly wished to avoid that in the future. 
 
The managers were also acutely aware that they might at some point in the 
future be dependent on their shareholders for more active support. This might 
arise if they wished to raise new capital to fund an acquisition or major 
expansion or, more critically still, if they had to fend off a hostile takeover bid. 
On such occasions both the future direction of the company and the future 
employment of the managers themselves might well be at stake, and the 
institutional shareholders would hold the whip hand. 
 
One way of responding to this pressure would be to accept the owner-fiduciary 
model and do what the investors wanted, and it was apparent from our 
background research that several of the companies in our sample, having 
experienced embarrassing share price declines, had adopted this route in the 
recent past. Only one manager talked in such terms, however, pointing out that 
there was no point driving a business in a direction its investors didn’t want. At 
another point in the interview, moreover, the same manager offered an 
alternative: either do what the investors want, or educate them to be happy with 
what you want to do. And it was the second of these options that came up 
repeatedly in the other interviews. From the managers’ perspectives their job 
was to manage and the investors’ job was to invest. It was not for shareholders 
to dictate what managers should do. But in order to keep control of the situation 
it was imperative that managers educated their investors so that they understood 
and shared the management agenda. In part this was just a question of ensuring 
clarity and consistency of message, avoiding any grounds for misunderstanding, 
but it was also a question of ensuring that the investors had the right 
understanding – the understanding the managers wanted them to have. In this 
context a critical response from an investor was a prompt not for rethinking the 
strategy but for rethinking the communications. 
 
A second recurring theme was the need to manage expectations, so as to ensure 
as far as possible that investors were never surprised either by the company’s 
results or by the managers’ strategic moves. Managers talked of the need to keep 
speculation under control, making sure that investors didn’t get over-exited or 
read too much into their strategic moves, only to over-react when their 
expectations weren’t met. They also talked of the need to condition investors 
well in advance of any major moves, so that these didn’t come as a shock. 
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A third theme that ran very strongly through all the interviews concerned the 
building up of trust or credit with investors so that if the managers ever needed 
their support they would be prepared to give it, even though they might not be 
convinced by the case in question. Managers talked here of the need to build up 
good relationships in the good times so that they could carry investors with them 
in times of trouble; and of building up enough trust, or “credit in the bank” to 
give them the freedom to make major moves, such as acquisitions, that investors 
would not otherwise support. The emphasis here was on the need for open, 
transparent relationships with long-term shareholders, on the dangers of making 
enemies by behaving arrogantly or ignoring governance conventions, and on the 
absolute necessity of delivering on any promises made.  
 
Finally, a fourth common theme was the need to reduce dependence on 
individual institutions by actively managing the shareholder base. The ideal 
shareholder base from a managerial perspective appeared to be a large and 
diverse group of investors, including active traders, for liquidity, but dominated 
by long-term investors, each with a relatively small percentage holding. Large 
holdings were considered dangerous, both because of the potential power they 
gave to the institutions concerned and because of the potential disruption if these 
institutions changed their minds and sold. The managers also recognized as a 
fact of life that institutions churned their portfolios, and that they might well sell 
blocks of stock for reasons that did not reflect directly on performance – for 
profit-taking when the share price was rising, for example, or as a consequence 
of other, unrelated portfolio adjustments. They considered it important to ensure 
that there were willing buyers to match the sellers, and actively marketed their 
shares to institutions that were not current shareholders, both at home and 
overseas. It was in this context that some of our interviewees talked of their 
investors as customers and used marketing language to describe how they 
interacted with them. Managing their shareholder base was about winning new 
customers, and managing their investor communications was about retaining 
those they had. 
 
Power and Resource Dependence 
The centrality of these themes to our managers’ discourses suggests strongly 
that the relationship between corporations and institutional investors might be 
most appropriately theorized in terms of power, generally, and resource 
dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), more specifically. 
 
Our interview analysis suggested that both corporate managers and fund 
managers were acutely aware of the power wielded by the latter by virtue of 
their control over financial and voting resources, and this was confirmed by our  
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direct observations of their meetings. In these meetings, the senior executives of 
leading global corporations traveled to the offices of investing institutions, at 
those institutions’ convenience, to face questioning by much more junior 
analysts and fund managers, many still in their twenties, who had no conception 
of what was involved in running such a company. Although it was 
commonplace for the corporation to field its chief executive for these meetings, 
it was most unusual for an institution to field even a division head, let alone its 
chief investment officer or chief executive. The institutions controlled the 
agendas for the meetings, and the settings, in luxuriously furnished paneled 
rooms, emphasized their power and status.  
 
Our expectations going into the research were that in these meetings at least the 
institutional investors would act out the identity of owners, but this was not what 
we observed. The display of power was evident, but it did not need any concept 
of ownership to support it: resource control was quite sufficient. In one meeting 
we observed, the institution (part of a global investment bank) did not actually 
own shares in the company, but this if anything enhanced the sense of power. 
The message being conveyed was clear: “you badly need us to be at least 
potential shareholders, prepared in principle to invest, and if we do invest you 
will need us even more!” 
 
Our research design allowed us to observe directly both the symbolic exercise of 
institutional investors’ power and its impact on the managers’ discourse, and in 
both cases to link the power with resource control rather than any rights of 
ownership. It did not allow us to observe directly the managers’ response, but in 
our interviews with company managers they described many of the tactics 
identified by Pfeffer (1992) to employ their own countervailing power. They 
described the ways in which, while formally leaving the agendas for their 
meetings to the investors, they sought to frame the exchanges in these meetings 
by setting the bases for contrast and comparison. They noted how, in doing this, 
they drew on one resource advantage they did have, control over internal 
company information and analysis. They talked of carefully managing the 
content, timing and sequence of their communications, releasing information in 
such a way as to control investor perceptions of changing strategies or results. 
They talked of building investor commitment both to a company’s direction and 
to its top management team, and of capturing the psychological moment for 
major announcements or initiatives. They also talked, more obliquely, of their 
efforts to divide and conquer. One political advantage that company managers 
enjoy over their shareholders is that while the latter wield collective control over 
resources they are also each others’ competitors, reluctant to share any insights 
or information that might give them a relative trading advantage. By widening  
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their shareholder base, while at the same time trying to build commitment at the 
personal level with individual institutions and fund managers, the managers 
sought to maximize this advantage. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we have explored how the senior executives of institutional 
investors and the companies in which they invest conceptualize the activities of 
institutional investors, their relationships with companies and their role in the 
corporate governance process. Our study has evident limitations. It is 
exploratory in nature, and the methodology employed was designed to identify 
different conceptualizations, not to test one against another. Moreover, apart 
from the very limited observation of company-investor meetings, we were not 
able to observe how the accounts offered by our interviewees related to the 
practices they purported to describe. This was a limitation especially on the 
company side, where we remain unclear as to how far managers’ accounts of 
their own exercise of power, in resisting and controlling shareholder pressures, 
constituted a realistic description of their actions, and how far they represented 
wishful thinking or defensive rationalizations. 
 
The other main limitation of the study is geographic. For practical reasons we 
have based our research on companies with their primary listings on the London 
Stock Exchange and London-based investing institutions, and this may well 
have affected our results. For example, from a related study of a wider group of 
fund managers (reference suppressed) it appears that communications between 
institutional investors and companies are in some respects more open and 
transparent in the UK than in either the USA or continental Europe, and this 
may well be reflected in their conceptualizations of their relationship. It seems 
likely, however, that the main substance of our findings will apply in the 
American as well as the British context. Most of the people we interviewed 
work in globally operating businesses. The companies, all relatively large by 
international standards, have significant international and especially American 
shareholders, and most of the managers we interviewed routinely interact with 
American as well as British based investors. The majority of the institutional 
investors in our sample had Wall Street as well as London offices, with a 
commonality of practices and procedures. And while there are some legal and 
institutional differences, there is a general consensus that the systems of 
corporate governance operating in the UK and USA are essentially the same (see 
for example Black & Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 2001; Franks & Mayer, 1997).  
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The core of our findings is that while both popular and academic discourses of 
corporate governance are dominated by conceptualizations in terms of agency 
and/or ownership, these play only a secondary role in the actors’ 
conceptualizations. The ownership model, in which investors are owners with 
rights and managers are fiduciaries with duties, was broadly accepted as a 
general theorization of the governance system as a whole, but had little practical 
force. When investors invoked the language of ownership it was to satisfy the 
political needs of their own clients rather than to make demands of company 
managers, and while managers recognized some kind of theoretical duty to 
shareholders in general, and were willing to engage publicly in ownership 
rhetoric, they did not see themselves as practically obligated to serve any 
particular shareholders. The agency model, in which investors are cast as 
principals and managers self-seeking owners, played no part in the managers’ 
accounts and was invoked by investors only in very specific circumstances, such 
as in the context of outrageous pay settlements or value-destroying acquisitions. 
 
In place of agency and ownership, the thematic structuring of our interviewees’ 
accounts was dominated by two other conceptualizations. In the first place, 
investors saw themselves, and were seen by managers, primarily as financial 
traders with no particular interest in either ownership or control. They just 
happened to be trading in shares rather than currencies, options or bonds, and 
were shareholders almost by accident. Accompanying this conceptualization, 
implicitly if not explicitly, was that of managers as stewards, who were doing 
their honest best to make profits for their companies just as the fund managers / 
traders were doing their best to make profits for their own institutions. The 
investors invested, the managers traded, and in the normal course of events that 
was that. 
 
In the second place, and reflecting the fact that this ‘normal’ course of events 
was never permanent, the managers saw investors as providers of scarce 
resources that they might at some time in the future need. From this 
management perspective, investors were potential providers of the additional 
capital that might be needed to fund an expansion or acquisition. They also 
provided the votes that might be needed in times of trouble, such as in a hostile 
takeover situation. 
 
From the interview evidence, this latter conceptualization would appear to be the 
most salient in determining management actions, and to be closely linked with a 
framing of manager-shareholder interactions in terms of power and political 
tactics. This conclusion is reinforced, moreover, by our observations of 
company-investor meetings, in which the symbolic exercise of power by the  
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investing institutions and the location of this power in the control of resources 
rather than in the moral authority of ownership are evident.  
 
These findings suggest that the relationship between company managers and 
institutional investors might more usefully be theorized in terms of resource-
dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and organizational power (Pfeffer, 
1992), rather than in the more usual terms of economic agency and control or 
ownership rights and fiduciary obligations. Following Pfeffer & Salancik’s 
(1978) exploration of intra-organizational politics in terms of resource-
dependence and their identification of director networks as sources of 
organizational control over the environment, resource dependence theory has 
frequently been employed within the corporate governance literature to explore 
board roles and the relationship between board structure and performance (e.g. 
Boyd, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Hillman et al, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). It has not, however, been employed in the analysis of manager-
shareholder relationships. Moreover, despite the fact that the separation of 
ownership and control is often described in overtly political terms (Monks & 
Minow, 1991; Pound, 1992; Useem, 1984, 1993, 1996), there have been no 
detailed analyses of these relationships in terms of organizational power. 
 
One result of these gaps in the literature is that important and widely held 
perceptions remain empirically untested. It is commonly held, for example, that 
the power of investors over managers has increased in recent years. But while 
this view has been vividly illustrated, for example by Useem (1996), it has not 
been critically analyzed. Powerful arguments to the effect that investor power 
has led to a ‘financialization’ of company strategy in which traditional product-
market strategic direction has been replaced by short-term share price 
management (Froud et al, 2000) have enormous implications for both managers 
and society but again remain untested. It is evident that managers and investors 
are engaged in some kind of power struggle, but without studying in detail the 
political behaviors in which they are engaged we cannot safely make assertions 
as to the balance of power, nor can we say with confidence how this impacts on 
management decisions and performance outcomes. 
 
Addressing issues such as these will need further research of two kinds. It will 
need detailed observational studies both of the processes leading up to 
management communications to shareholders and of the ways in which strategy-
forming processes are shaped by the political context. And it will need 
quantitative population level studies to test hypotheses derived from resource 
dependence theory alongside those from agency and stewardship theories, where 
the resources measured are those directly pertinent to manager-shareholder  
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relationships rather than, as is commonly the case, to board structure and 
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